Glynn F. Wayment, Edward C. England v. William Howard, Lee R. Howard : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2005
Glynn F. Wayment, Edward C. England v. William
Howard, Lee R. Howard : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John H. Mabey Jr.; David C. Wright; Mabey & Wright; Attorneys for Appellees.
J. Craig Smith; D. Scott Crook; Scott M. Ellsworth; Smith Hartvigsen; Attorneys for Appellants.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Glynn F. Wayment, Edward C. England v. William Howard, Lee R. Howard, No. 20050547.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2583
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
GLYNN F. WAYMENT and EDWARD C. 
ENGLAND, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
v. 
WILLIAM HOWARD, 
Defendant, 
and LEE R. HOWARD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
LEE R. HOWARD, 
Counterclaimant/Appellant, 
GLYNN F. WAYMENT and EDWARD C. 
ENGLAND, 
Counterdefendants. 
Appellants9 Reply 
Appellate No.: 20050547 
Civil No.: 010903790 WA 
Judge W. Brent West 
Appeal from Decisions of the Second Judicial District Court 
Judge Brent West 
John H. Mabey, Jr. 
David C. Wright 
Mabey & Wright, LLC 
265 East 100 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellees 
J. Craig Smith (4143) 
D. Scott Crook (7495) 
Scott M. Ellsworth (7514) 
Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC 
215 South State Street, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 413-1600 
Facsimile (801) 413-1620 
Attorneys for Appellants: 
Defendant/Counterclaimant, Lee R. Howard 
FILED 
UTAH APPEI i ATE COURT? 
MAY t 0 2006 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
GLYNN F. WAYMENT and EDWARD C. 
ENGLAND, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
v. 
WILLIAM HOWARD, 
Defendant, 
and LEE R. HOWARD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
LEE R. HOWARD, 
Counterclaimant/Appellant, 
GLYNN F. WAYMENT and EDWARD C. 
ENGLAND, 
Counterdefendants. 
Appellants' Reply 
Appellate No.: 20050547 
Civil No.: 010903790 WA 
Judge W. Brent West 
Appeal from Decisions of the Second Judicial District Court 
Judge Brent West 
John H. Mabey, Jr. 
David C. Wright 
Mabey & Wright, LLC 
265 East 100 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellees 
J. Craig Smith (4143) 
D. Scott Crook (7495) 
Scott M.Ellsworth (7514) 
Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC 
215 South State Street, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 413-1600 
Facsimile (801) 413-1620 
Attorneys for Appellants: 
Defendant/Counterclaimant, Lee R. Howard 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
ARGUMENT 1 
INTRODUCTION 1 
POINT 1 THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DETERMINATION THAT THE HOWARD DIKE INTERFERES WITH THE 
PLAINTIFFS'WATER RIGHT 5 
A. INTERFERENCE AS A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT 5 
B. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF INTERFERENCE TO MARSHALL 7 
L Plaintiffs' "DevastatingEvidence." 7 
2. The Absence of Evidence and the Inadequacy of the Findings Excuses the 
Howards from the Marshalling Requirement 12 
C. GENERAL IRRIGATION DUTIES ON THE UTAH DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS 
WEBSITE D O NOT TRUMP PARTICULAR DUTIES IMPOSED BY A CERTIFICATE OF 
APPROPRIATION 13 
POINT 2 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE HOWARDS' 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS 17 
A. PLAINTIFFS FAILED PROPERLY TO DISPUTE HOWARD'S STATEMENTS OF 
UNDISPUTED FACT 17 
B. THE TRIAL COURT DISREGARDED THE EXPRESS MANDATE OF URCP 56(d) 19 
C. THE PLAINTIFFS' INTERFERENCE CLAIM WAS BARRED BY RES JUDICA TA, THE 
RELEVANT ISSUES IN BOTH THE EARLIER APPLICATION PROCEEDING AND THE TRIAL 
BELOW BEING IDENTICAL 20 
POINT 3 THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY DISPOSED OF THE 
HOWARD'S COUNTERCLAIMS 21 
B. THE HOWARDS' NEGLIGENCE AND NUISANCE COUNTERCLAIMS 23 
CONCLUSION 24 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 26 
4819-5476-0193.HO951.001 Page ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Adams v. Portage Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co., 95 Utah 1, 72 P.2d 648 (Utah 1937) 1 
Anderson v. Doms, 1999 UT App 207, f 10, 984 P.2d 392 12 
Archer v. B d. of State Lands an d Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1995) 22 
Basic Controlex Corp., Inc. v. Klockner Moeller Corp., 202 F.3d 450 (1st Cir. 2000) 16 
College Irr. Co. v. Logan River & Blacksmith Forklrr. Co., 780 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1989).. 1, 9, 12 
Gary Porter Const, v. Fox Const., Inc., 2004 UT App 354, 101 P.3d 371 17, 18 
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992) 16 
Mouty v. The Sandy City Recorder, 2005 UT 41,117, 122 P.3d 521 22 
Provo River Water Users Ass'n v. Lambert, 642 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1982) 16 
Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 2006 UT 20, — P.3d—, 2006 WL 744261 22 
Salt Lake City et al. v. Salt Lake City Water & Electrical Power Co., 25 Utah 456, 71 P. 1069... 9 
Salt Lake City v. Gardner, 39 Utah 30, 114 P. 17 6 
Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 2000 UT 3, 5 P.3d 120 6 
Salt Lake County v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23, 89P.3d 155, 17 
Schott Optical Glass, Inc. v. United States, 82 Cust. Ct. 11, 468 F. Supp. 1318 (1979) 11 
Searle v. Milburn Irr. Co., 2006 UT 16, 547 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 6 
United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 49, 79 P.3d 945 24 
Statutes 
UCA§63-46a-4 14 
UCA§ 73-3-3 4 
UCA § 73-2-1 13, 14 
UCA § 73-3-8 7, 15 
Rules 
URCPRule7 17 
URCPRule56 19 
Treatises 
10B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 
("FPP"), Civ. 3d § 2737 (1998) 19 
4819-5476-0193.HO951.001 Page Hi 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Weary of being the lone voice in this dispute defending long-settled Utah water 
law, the Howards note yet again that a cause of action for interference with approved 
appropriation of water cannot exist absent a showing that the claimant's water has been 
diminished in either merit or measure: 
as long as [a water right owner] receives at his point of diversion the 
quantity and quality to which his appropriation entitles him, he as an 
appropriator, has no control over or concern with what anyone else may 
do on or with the stream, or what uses, if any, they may make thereof. 
Adams v. Portage Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co., 95 Utah 1, 72 P.2d 648, 653 (Utah 
1937) (emphasis added); see also College Irr. Co. v. Logan River & Blacksmith Forklrr. 
Co., 780 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah 1989) ("[S]o long as a water user has sufficient water at 
its point of diversion to satisfy its right, it has no complaint about upstream uses of water. 
. . ." (citations omitted)). 
Far from showing any decrease in either quantity or quality of the water available 
to them, however, the evidence before the trial court overwhelmingly demonstrated that, 
for years, the Plaintiffs have taken and continue to take from the Slough considerably 
more than the 75 acre-feet to which they are entitled (R. 308 & 345; 1625:59-60; FF f 11 
(Add. Tab J)). They have taken water at a rate of flow far greater than the lA cfs which 
they are allowed and outside their approved period of use: May 1st through September 
30th (R. 308, 324, 332-33, 345; R. 1625 at 199-200). Since 1998, Plaintiffs have taken 
from the Slough over 2000% of their entitlement (id.), all of which they put to use 
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irrigating far more acreage than they have any right to irrigate (R. 308, 346, & 1625 at 
60-68, 195-98; FF ffi[12 & 41 (Add. Tab J)). And the crowning irony: since the Howards 
built the dike in 1998, Plaintiffs have had more water than at any time in the preceding 40 
years (R. 347 & 1625 at 68-71). 
Plaintiffs have not, in short, suffered any interference with their water right, do not 
have standing to bring their non-existent interference claims against the Howards, and— 
despite the length and expense of this dispute—do not have the proof to support any 
claims against the Howards. The Howards were thus understandably confused and 
alarmed by the trial court's ruling holding them liable for this imaginary interference: 
when someone has not been injured, he should not be able to hale his neighbor into court 
demanding reparations. 
Despite the illicit bloating of their water right, however, Plaintiffs continue waving 
red herrings about, arguing that the Howards are somehow to blame for imaginary losses 
they admit not having suffered. Plaintiffs have taken their allotment of water, and more, 
twenty times over. They do not—they cannot possibly—have any claim for interference. 
Diminution of their water right is the last thing in the world Plaintiffs can complain of. 
Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that the Howards' dike does "impound" 
some amount of water flowing through the Slough (which it does not), the amount 
impounded would be a teaspoon to a bucket, considering the enormous amount of water 
Plaintiffs unlawfully store, divert and use. It is this unlawful diversion which eviscerates 
Plaintiffs' claim and demands reversal of the trial court's ruling. 
Consider a hypothetical situation: I am a hunter with a license to bag one goose a 
4819-5476-0193.HO951.001 Page 2 
day. Geese typically fly from a pond on your fallow property to my cultivated grain fields 
to feed. However, rather than one goose, in reality anu ii = ,;»>MU>»r. of the law I bag ten 
twenty geese migrate onto my property each day? Should I be able to force you to leave 
your land fallo \ v try arguing that my poaching does not excuse or justify your 
"ii iterference" w itl 1 n p ilk gal 1 i i stl i : • :I : f • Dperatioi 1? No one is "It iterferir" r" ' •* :""(l ! l my 
hunting rights; I'm still getting my goose and a great many more besides. \ o one is 
going to order y on to abet my poaching just because I ve deluded myself in;, .^ wevwg T 
deserve the nine geese I'm poaching and blame you for interfering ^; )<\\• i11. 
"need." And no one is going to buy in to my bizarre argument that the whole situation is 
s . . • >u;.ut\ . . . WVL- ....; excuse or jiistif y your interference." 
(Br.Opr 27.) 
Plaintiffs have never sought proper authorization for any of the many differences 
between tl ic: ii i igl it in tl 1 z ii Cei tificate c f \ ppi opi iatioi 1 and tl 1 di a ::t i ml \ ' atei i ise in 
practice. No approval permits their taking over 2000% of the water lo winch they are 
entitled. No approved Exchange or Change Application memorializes approval for thei11 
to di\ ei t: \* ate i i n idei tl leir War r en It rigation shai es it it : • tl i z 1^  lai i ic till: Sloi igl I. :t 101 < "toes 
any further approval allow them to store that water in the Slough, or to divert it out of the 
Slough, or to use it ov^ i;„ u irrigated acreage (whicli, b> the way, comprises well over 
250°.. t^"'1- " -!••••. •• -imii^ Nothin fI -!vi : . • i... .
 K.., 
into the Slough of the water flowing in the County drainage ditch east of 59th West, nor 
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its storage in the Slough, nor its rediversion for use in Plaintiffs' unlawful irrigation.1 
Plaintiffs did not even have authorization to dredge the Slough in 1997 (R. 341-42) so as 
to illegally store and redivert unlawfully appropriated water to illicitly irrigate 
unauthorized acreage. 
Plaintiffs' enormities, however, although reprehensible and indeed criminal, see 
UCA §§ 73-3-3(9), 73-2-27(l)(d) & (2), are merely by the way for our present purposes. 
The focus of the present dispute is the Plaintiffs' utterly groundless assertion, whence the 
trial court's equally groundless ruling, that the Howards have somehow interfered with 
the Plaintiffs' water right by constructing a dike—with the approval of the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers and the acquiescence of the Utah State Engineer—which has had no 
effect whatever on the flows in the Slough. To the contrary, Plaintiffs' ability to get 
water from the slough has actually improved since the installation of the Howard dike: 
Q [By J. Craig Smith] So is the ability to water out of the slough 
better now than it was—let's say in 2002 than it was in 1995? 
A [By Glynn Wayment] Yes, I think. Yes, it is, but it's not 
better than it was back in 1970 and 1975 in there. 
(R. 315, 660; see also R. 1625 at 70.) What evidence there is, in sum, shows that 
Plaintiffs have always received, and continue to take, many times more water than their 
water right allows. Accordingly, evidence supporting Plaintiffs' interference claim 
Nor, incidentally, have Plaintiffs ever sought or received permission from the Howards 
(or from anyone else), to flood the Howards' land and turn it into a bog. This, however, is 
the unhappy result of their improper diversion of the water in the County drainage ditch. 
(See R. 1571 at 28-29 & 480-94; 1573 at 411-14, 418, 459-60, & 462-65.) 
2
 The pipes installed through the dike (36 and 15 inches) more than suffice to permit the 
same historic flows as had existed prior to the dike's construction (R. 324 & 351; Trial: 
R. 1573 at 401-09; Tr.Exh. 33). The pipes prevent (although the dike does not cause) any 
backup of water (see id. & R. 354-58; Trial: R. 1573 at 406-09), and there has been no 
additional ponding on either side of the dike since it was built (id.). 
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simply does not, cannot, exist: The water which Plaintiffs may legally claim—0.5 cfs, up 
to 75 acre-feet—is submerged beneath 19 times that much water, which would all have to 
1 r 
right, let alone interfere with it. 
Plaintiffs have adduced no e\ idence demonstrating any decrease in either flow or 
pumping capacity. Plaintiffs have 11 I, in l.i I i'nionstiiilni .im, 11111111", .it ,iil . 11 n 1 111.1 ln.il 
court should not have let the action survive beyond summary judgment, to say nothing of 
t 
POINT 1 THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT THE HOWARD 
DIKE INTERFERES WITH THE PLAINTIFFS' 
WATER RIGHT, 
A. INTERFERENCE AS \ Mm- h ll Mi M HIM UI I, "", , w JH r u 1 
Plaintiffs argue that the issue of "interference is a straightforward question of fact: 
either Howard's dike interfered with [Plaintiffs'] water right ... 01 u HKI not" (Br.Opp. 
22).3 Plaintiffs' argument, however '! . . •. .:; ^- » 
"interference" is not a factual issue at all h* the contrary, Plaintiffs have maintained 
tl 11 01 igl IC 1  it tl: .e fi i < e 3 eai s of tl lis dispi itc: , tl lat a determination of interference ii ivolves not 
merely questions of diminution of water quantity * " • • J ' i f \ (evidence of whicn P!. r r: \ t: • 
have yet to produce), but the plainly legal issues 01 water quantity seizable without 
Plaintiffs' vehemence on this point may be ascribed to their belief that this Court will 
rubber-stamp the trial court's Decision because the Howards have "fail[ed] to marshal all 
of the evidence supporting th[e interference] finding." (Br.Opp. 25). Plaintiffs would 
have been better served by pointing out to the Howards some of the evidence Plaintiffs 
expect them to marshal—that is, evidence actually supporting the trial court's Decision 
(The Howards have found none in the record, see the discussion in Section LB, below). 
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authorization in addition to one's original grant and the protectability of one's means of 
appropriation (i.e., accessibility4) irrespective of unlicensed overappropriation. Given the 
fact that it is this "additional," legally questionable, water with which Plaintiffs claim the 
Howards have interfered, Plaintiffs can hardly assert now that their interference claim is 
nothing but "a straightforward question of fact." It is Plaintiffs, not the Howards, who 
have pushed this issue beyond what might reasonably pass as a solely factual question. 
Attempting to sidestep the mixed-question standard of review set forth by this 
Court in Searle v. Milburn Irr. Co., 2006 UT 16, 547 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, Plaintiffs go on 
at length about Searle *s Change Application focus. Even were the Court to rule 
interference solely a question of fact, however (and the Howards have never contended 
that a factual determination of cause and effect has no place in such an analysis),5 to 
allow Plaintiffs such a protective legal cocoon as the clear-error standard would be to 
abet Plaintiffs' disregard of the law. Plaintiffs have unlawfully seized, diverted, 
rediverted, and applied water without ever once filing the appropriate change or exchange 
applications.6 They cannot now call the Searle standard inapplicable simply because they 
In connection with accessibility's nature as a legal and not a merely factual 
consideration, see, e.g., Salt Lake City v. Gardner, 39 Utah 30, 114 P. 17, 152-53 
(discussing at length the factual and legal considerations involved in such a 
determination). 
5
 See, for example, Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 2000 UT 3, ^[24-26, 5 
P.3d 1206, which discusses a trial court's "finding" that interception of source water in a 
mine "substantially interferes" with the rights of other appropriators. This, however, is 
simply the factual portion of a logically mixed question. 
6
 Plaintiffs appear to believe—ostensibly, at least—that ignoring such requirements is 
harmless, and they cite to Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 2000 UT 3, ^37, 5 
P.3d 1206, in support. {Br.Opp. 27.) This is both disingenuous and erroneous. Silver 
Fork dealt with issues of forfeiture. The Court there noted that failure to follow the 
mandated procedures of changing point of diversion, although creating no right to such a 
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are stealing the water rather than seeking the lawful right to use it. And this, of course, 
would entail the I H A §73-3-8(1) analysis Plaintiffs admit must be addressed as a mixed 
qi lestion of la (« and fact ( Bi O i > i 23 ) 
B. THERE IS N O EVIDENCE OF INTERFERENCE TO MARSHALL, 
In any case, however, the entiu absence from ih^ iccon- r any evidence of 
interference renders the |iii • >li«Mi nl iii;iisli;iHifij» ninnl i/i-.|nn i w\> ii'.snlimi iiut 
the Howards have failed \w satisfy the marshalling requirement by uomit[ting] 
u/whum;;.. . • . .. : . rcaiiu < ... . , devastating evidence" to 
which Plaintiffs point is nothing of the sort. As a matter of fact, *?**•--. * \ idiMin*" 
there is plainly demonstrates the insufficiency of Plaintiffs' claims. 
1. Plaint ij ustating Evidence." 
"fLJ'audace" recommended Danton, "encore de Vaudace, toujours de Vaudace^1 
and Plaintiffs have taken his advice to heart, presumptuously adducing as "devastating 
evident'1'" "i |IM h • I I ' H ' P I *• I •'" "" i ' f ' t r a g i a p l i r ll< I'IMOII', • II• • an I * hihl .Jiith 
do not show any interference. Unfortunately, Plaintiffs' evidence falls far short of 
Plaintiffs' hopes and fizzles as badly as Danton's revolution. 
(k Lee & owai 'd • s ul itteitt " I laintiffs cit z t : • tl le t = stii i ion> of 
Steven Clyde, Plaintiffs' erstwhile attorney, and that of John Mann, Regional Engineer 
f , i :.ic ei iea u.^ Howard admitted that his real purpose for installing 
point of diversion and entailing criminal liability, was not tantamount to forfeiture of the 
holder's usufructory interest in the water. This observation by the Silver Fork Court, 
however, hardly excuses Plaintiffs' defiance of statutorily mandated procedure in the 
present instance. 
7
 Loosely "audacity, audacity, always audacity." 
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the dike was to impound water": 
Clyde: He [Mr. Howard's attorney] indicated his client was in 
fact impounding water because they were having difficulty due to relatively 
low flows getting water into a pond area that they had and wanted to back 
up water sufficiently enough that they could pump into their pond. 
Secondly, they were having difficulty keeping livestock confined and 
wanted the dike across the slough to support a fence so they could control 
cattle. 
(R.1627 (originally 1573), 521:1-12 & 522:3-11 (Steven Clyde).) 
Q [by David Wright] Did either of the Howards ever describe to 
you or explain to you why they were putting the dike in the slough? 
A [by John Mann] In the course of conversations they'd 
indicated that they didn't want to have their side of the slough de-watered 
completely and that they wanted to make sure, you know, that the plaintiffs 
didn't overuse the water right that they had established. 
Q So you said they wanted to make sure that their side was not 
de-watered, is that what you said, over here? 
A That's what I said. I'm not sure that's completely accurate 
but anyway, they wanted to make sure there was not water removed from 
their property in excess of the water right that would have been—that the 
plaintiffs would have been entitled to, let me put it that way. 
(R.1626 (originally 1572), 236: 7-20.) 
Leaving aside Mr. Howard's continuing insistence that he never said that the 
intent behind the installation of the dike was to impound water (since it wasn't) so as to 
deprive Plaintiffs of their ill-gotten supply (which it doesn't), these transcript excepts do 
not prove anything. Ordinarily, of course, intent is a necessary, but not a sufficient 
condition of a given act. Intent is a necessary element to a murder conviction, but it is 
hardly sufficient to prove that a murder took place, especially in the absence of anyone 
being killed. In the same way, evidence of Mr. Howard's intent in installing the dike— 
however questionable—does not ipso facto prove that the dike impounds water or 
interferes in any way with the flow of water in the Marriott Slough. 
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On the contrary, Plaintiffs have never adduced any evidence of interference: The 
flows in the Slough have not decreased; they have, according to Plaintiff Glynn 
Wayment, actually improved since the installation of the dike (R. 315, 660; see also R. 
1625 at 70). Plaintiffs can show no deficit whatsoever in quantity or quality of the water 
they receive and do not, consequently, have any right at all to seek reparations from the 
Howards. "Indeed, it would be contrary to the universal sense of mankind to permit 
redress where there has been no wrong." Salt Lake City et al. v. Salt Lake City Water & 
Electrical Power Co., 25 Utah 456, 71 P. 1069, 1072. "Neither at common law," the Salt 
Lake Water & Electrical Court observed, "nor under the law of appropriation, does [an] 
appropriator own the water in the stream," id., quite the reverse: "[S]o long as a water 
user has sufficient water at its point of diversion to satisfy its right, it has no complaint 
about upstream uses of water. . . ." College Irr. Co, 780 P.2d at 1244. Plaintiffs, of 
course, have 20 times the water sufficient to satisfy their right, and can therefore have no 
complaint about the Howards' dike. 
b^ Whether the Howard Dike Impounds Water. Equally debile 
and irrelevant is the "evidence of impoundment" which, Plaintiffs argue, the Howards 
should have marshaled. 
The Howards are uncertain as to the relevance of such "evidence" in light of the 
fact that evidence of impoundment of water behind the dike (of which there is none since 
the dike doesn't hold back any of Plaintiffs' water) is entirely irrelevant unless Plaintiffs 
fail to receive water sufficient to satisfy their water right, i.e., unless it is first established 
that there has been any interference. Plaintiffs cannot, in sum, assume established the 
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very point at issue and then denounce activities perfectly innocent absent the point's 
establishment. 
Ignoring such logical puzzles, however, Plaintiffs point to the testimony of 
Regional Engineer John Mann as "critical," "devastating evidence" that the Howard dike 
impounds water: 
Well, I walked back over the dike and [sic] just to refresh my memory as to 
what was there as best I could. It was raining yesterday morning so I 
probably wasn't as observant as I might have been if it had been a little 
different circumstance but nonetheless, water on the Howard side, not so 
much water perhaps on the other side. 
(R. 1626 at 233: 4-16.) Even assuming the alleged impoundment relevant without first 
establishing some sort of diminution in Plaintiffs' water supply, this is hardly the 
"devastating evidence" Plaintiffs paint it to be. Here is Mr. Mann, looking at the Slough 
in a rainstorm, "so [he's] probably [not] as observant as [he] might have been," 
measuring the water on either side of the dike, by eye, and concluding that there is "water 
on the Howard side" but "no so much water perhaps on the other side." (Id., emphasis 
added.) Moreover, Mr. Mann's observation took place during the trial, in November of 
2003—a period during which Plaintiffs have no call on or right to use any water. So 
Mann's casual observation establishes nothing: It was made at a time when Plaintiffs had 
no right to divert or use the water in the Slough. The trumpeting of Mann's testimony is 
a damning indictment of Plaintiffs' "evidence" of interference. This was the best they 
could do? No citations to observations, let along measurements taken during irrigation 
8
 Incidentally, it was only a few days later that the trial judge went to look at the dike 
during trial. This onsite visit, which Plaintiffs tout so highly, thus shares the same 
deficiencies as Mann's visit to the dike did. Both have little if any probative value. 
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season when Plaintiffs have some right take water? 
Plaintiffs also cite to two conclusory opinions offered by Plaintiffs during trial: 
that of Glynn Wayment: 
Q [by David Wright] Okay. Since the Howard dike has been 
installed, would you describe to the Court how, if at all, how it has changed 
the slough or your ability to pump or irrigate? 
A [by Glynn Wayment] Yes. With the dam in there, it's cut our 
cycle in half and we're not able to draw clear up here to the separation tin 
and that's half our water. So you'd say the cycle is cut in half. 
(R. 1625 at 46:5-11); and that of Edward England: "The dike definitely holds back 
water" (R. 151:15). As has been noted before, though, "[a] statement of a witness, which 
is based solely upon his own opinion, and which is merely a conclusion of an ultimate 
fact in issue, has no probative value." Schott Optical Glass, Inc. v. United States, 82 Cust. 
Ct. 11, 22-23, 468 F. Supp. 1318, 1325 (1979) (citations omitted). 
Plaintiffs finally cite to the photographs they include at Tab D of the Addendum to 
their Brief in Opposition, comprising Trial Exhibits Nos. 105, 106, and 107. These 
photographs, according to Plaintiffs, demonstrate that the dike impounds water. 
Actually, however, each of these various photos demonstrates that the water in the 
Slough is clearly moving through the pipes from the north side of the dike (facing the 
Howards' property) to the south side (toward Plaintiffs' properties). The bottom photo of 
Exhibit No. 107, which Plaintiffs particularly stress, is misleading: it depicts the dike 
from the north (the Howard property), but the tulies obscure the bottom of the pipe 
through which the water flows southward. This cannot, however, be seen, and the picture 
does not, as a result, show anything. 
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2. The Absence of Evidence and the Inadequacy of the 
Findings Excuses the Howards from the Marshalling 
Requirement 
Although the marshalling requirement is theoretically absolute, the Court of 
Appeals, aware that evidence cannot be marshaled if it does not exist in the record, has 
twice excused appellants from the requirement where challenged findings are 
"unsupported in the record," "are so inadequate that they cannot be meaningfully 
challenged," or "do not support the conclusion^]" based thereon. Anderson v. Doms, 
1999 UT App 207, ^[10, 984 P.2d 392 (quoting Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 
(UtahCtApp. 1991). 
Such is the case with the relevant "findings" in the present dispute. The trial 
court's findings on interference are utterly self-contradictory, remarkably vague, and 
completely unsupported in the record. In its Findings of Fact, the trial court declares that 
Plaintiffs adduced evidence at trial demonstrating that "[t]he [Howard] dike interferes 
with plaintiffs' water right ...." (R. 1457; FF&CL ^29). The trial court supports this 
inference with the singularly uninformative finding that "[t]he dike has decreased or 
slowed the flow of water to plaintiffs' pump and otherwise changef] the way the slough 
functions by changing its flow" (id.). Taken together, these two "findings" tautologically 
state only that the trial court found that the dike interfered because it believed that the 
dike interfered. 
Bearing in mind the College Irrigation requirement that interference can only exist 
when an appropriator lacks "sufficient water at its point of diversion to satisfy its right," 
780 P.2d at 1244, this finding simply cannot be reconciled with the previous one: 
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Neither plaintiffs nor defendants have taken any flow measurements in the 
slough. Plaintiffs have diverted more than 75 acre-feet of water from the 
Marriott Slough during the period May 1 to September 30. Plaintiffs 
irrigate more acreage than the 25 specified in the Certificate. 
(R. 1457; FF&CL 128.) How, the Howards ask yet again, can Plaintiffs claim to have 
suffered any interference when they appropriate many times their allotted water and have 
absolutely no idea how much is in the Slough at any given time anyway? Plaintiffs 
cannot produce a single measurement demonstrating any diminution in their unlawful 
take, and more than ever since the dike was installed. 
There is no evidence of interference in the record. Anywhere. And this entire 
absence of supporting evidence, coupled with the trial court's contradictory and 
inadequate findings, excuses the Howards from the meaningless task of reviewing 
irrelevancies in the name of marshalling, but without any real substance. 
C. GENERAL IRRIGATION DUTIES ON THE UTAH DIVISION OF 
WATER RIGHTS WEBSITE D O NOT TRUMP PARTICULAR 
DUTIES IMPOSED BY A CERTIFICATE OF APPROPRIATION. 
Plaintiffs vehemently argue that their irrigation duty is four acre-feet, regardless of 
their Certificate's specific three-acre-foot limitation (Br.Opp. 28-30). Plaintiffs' 
argument is essentially that, in order to "secure the equitable apportionment and 
distribution of ... water," UCA §73-2-l(3)(b), the State Engineer "might even use .... 
something as dubious as a website" (Br.Opp. 29-30). This position, however, contradicts 
the law. 
First, Utah law provides that 
[t]he state engineer may make rules, in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 
46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, consistent with the purposes 
and provisions of this title, governing: 
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(a) water distribution systems ...; 
(b) water measurement...; 
(d) the determination of water rights; and 
(e) the form and content of applications and related documents, 
maps, and reports. 
UCA §73-2-1(5) (emphasis added). This grant of permissive authority to regulate these 
several areas gives the State Engineer the authority to set irrigation duty limits by rule, 
should he or she so choose. UCA §63-46a-4, however, delineates a series of mandatory 
steps in the rule-adoption process, including filing with the Division of Administrative 
Rules, §63-46a-4(4)(a); publication in the Utah State Bulletin, §63-46a-4(4)(c); notice to 
interested parties, §63-46a-4(8); and a period for public comment, §63-46a-4(9). The 
duty limitations Plaintiffs cite, allegedly from the Division of Water Rights website, have 
not undergone any such proceeding, and do not, consequently have any force of law. 
They are, at best, policy suggestions (at worst, misleading irrelevancies). They certainly 
cannot be used by Plaintiffs to shield their illegal misappropriation and abuse of Utah's 
water, nor as a sword to justify their flagrant disregard of the three-acre-foot limitation on 
their Certificate of Appropriation. 
Second, Plaintiffs rely on the hedging, equivocal testimony of Regional Engineer 
John Mann (beginning: R. 1626 at 231), throughout which he sought to justify the four-
acre-foot duty. Of course, Plaintiffs pointedly ignore Mr. Mann's admission on cross 
examination that it is the duty on the Certificate that governs, not the duty suggested on 
the website: 
Q [by D. Scott Crook] ... you testified that [the duty has] 
changed now [from 3 acre-feet] to 4-acre feet but does a general irrigation 
duty bury the irrigation duty that's identified on a water certificate? 
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A [by John Mann] The certificate itself speaks for itself and I 
don't think that the duty that's established by the state engineer has 
authority to modify the certificate itself or the limits of the water right.... 
Q ... the state engineer's policy ... is to enforce limitation [sic] 
found in the certificate; is that correct? 
A I think that that would be the responsibility of the state 
engineer, yes .... 
... [I]f the certificate specifies a number of acre-feet then yes, the 
water user—that's what the water right would be. 
(R. 1626 at 264:13-265:13.) 
Third, a jump in irrigation duties from three acre-feet to four, to every irrigator 
diverting from the Weber River, would obviously create an enormous drain on the 
available water, especially given that the "Weber River is considered to be fully 
appropriated" (R. 1626 at 253:15-16). The lack of sufficient water would create 
automatic interference throughout the drainage, simply by virtue of the extra acre-foot 
draw. The State Engineer, however, may not permit appropriation where unappropriated 
water is not available. See, e.g., UCA § 73-3-8(l).9 
Fourth, Plaintiffs' notion that the Water Rights Website trumps the established 
Certificate falls foul of established norms of interpretation. It is well- and long-
established law—in both statutory and contractual contexts—that "if there is 
inconsistency, uncertainty or overlapping in the provisions of a document, language 
which deals more specifically with a subject matter takes precedence over general 
language." Provo River Water Users Ass'n v. Lambert, 642 P.2d 1219, 1227 (Utah 
9
 UCA §73-3-8(1) provides in relevant part as follows: "It shall be the duty of the state 
engineer to approve an application if: (a) there is unappropriated water in the proposed 
source; (b) the proposed use will not impair existing rights or interfere with the more 
beneficial use of the water; .... If an application does not meet the requirements of this 
section, it shall be rejected." 
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1982), see also Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992) ("[I]t is a 
commonplace of statutory construction that the specific governs the general" (citation 
omitted)); Basic Controlex Corp., Inc. v. Klockner Moeller Corp., 202 F.3d 450, 453 (1st 
Cir. 2000) ("faced with a conflict between provisions in a specific statute ... and the terms 
of a general law, ... the provisions of the specific statute prevail" (citation omitted)). 
While the Water Rights Website's suggested duty values and Plaintiffs' Certificate are 
not a single document, if the Website somehow has any legal stature the same sort of 
analysis ought to apply between a valid policy document and a particular instance of that 
policy's application. Thus the four of the webpage is overruled by the three of the 
Certificate of Appropriation.10 
Finally, from a policy perspective, adopting Plaintiffs' notion that the Division of 
Water Rights website somehow establishes controlling regulatory law would ultimately 
destroy the internet as a viable source of government information. That one might 
detrimentally rely upon information listed on a webpage—irrespective of whether it had 
the force of law (i.e., that it had been properly adopted as a rule or local ordinance)— 
must, in the long run, dissuade government entities from providing any internet access at 
all to any substantive provisions: the risk would be simply too great to justify any 
benefit. 
For all of these reasons, this Court should reject Plaintiffs' attempt to apotheosize 
10
 Plaintiffs' backwards view that general trumps specific leads only to chaos and 
calamity in a world where exceptions could never apply. An internet map of Utah 
highways, for example, listing speed limits on each, would have to be deemed to govern 
over posted speed limit signs along the road itself. And such speed limit signs would 
mean motorists could ignore temporary speed signs at construction sites. 
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a website over established law. Plaintiffs are entitled only to a duty of three acre-feet, as 
specified in their Certificate. 
POINT 2 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
HOWARDS1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS. 
A. PLAINTIFFS FAILED PROPERLY TO DISPUTE HOWARD'S 
STATEMENTS OF UNDISPUTED FACT. 
Plaintiffs assert that their piecemeal, fractional restatement and paraphrasing of the 
Howards' Summary Judgment undisputed facts nevertheless somehow satisfied the 
"verbatim restatement" requirement of URCP Rule 7(c)(3)(B). {Br.Opp. 31.) The rule, 
however, is quite explicit: verbatim means "verbatim," not "almost verbatim," to say 
nothing of "paraphrased" or "implied by reference." 
It is true the Court found in Salt Lake County v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 
UT 23 Tf23 n.4, 89 P.3d 155, that although the County had failed "to comply with the 
technical requirements of rule [7(c)(3)(B)]," the failure "was harmless in th[at] case" 
because the "disputed facts were clearly provided in the body of the memorandum with 
applicable record references...." id.n But it is also true, as the Court of Appeals pointed 
out in Gary Porter Const v. Fox Const, Inc., 2004 UT App 354, 101 P.3d 371, that 
Metro West may very have created the proverbial exception that swallows the rule, 
reducing the "verbatim restatement" mandate to "a mere suggestion," 2004 UT App 354, 
TJ15 n.2, and creating a troublesome procedural dilemma: 
[T]he rule announced by the [Metro West C]ourt leaves it unclear what 
remedies are available to trial courts for a party's failure to follow the 
procedure outlined in [URCP 7(c)(3)(B)].... [I]f failure to comply with the 
11
 The Howards are dismayed that they have had to do Plaintiffs' research for them in 
order to address this issue. 
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rule is "harmless" as long as a disputed fact can be gleaned from the 
opposition papers, then .... [it becomes] unclear whether granting summary 
judgment, because facts are admitted as undisputed that otherwise would 
not have been, is ever within the trial court's discretion for failure to 
comply with the rule. 
Id. (emphasis added, citations omitted).12 
In any event, Metro West's prescinsion of the rule's "technical requirements" from 
its informing policy is legally alarming. What is a rule, after all, but a set of technical 
requirements embodying the policy that informs it? Or how can a policy be enforced but 
through the enforcement of its instantiating rules? Ignore the "technicalities" of a recipe, 
and you abandon the hoped-for dish. Change the rhythm of a waltz, and it's no longer a 
waltz. Change a rule, and you renounce the policy behind it: "How can we know the 
dancer from the dance?"13 Disregarding the requirements of rule 7(c)(3)(B) negates 
entirely the underlying policy of clear and expeditious determination of the existence of 
factual issues, forcing trial judges instead to winnow through prose for information which 
should have been clearly listed, restated verbatim, and specifically disputed. 
It's up to the Court, of course, but the Howards, along with the Court of Appeals, 
respectfully submit that if Plaintiffs' improper responses to the Howards' undisputed 
12
 The Court of Appeals concluded with a rare request for clarification: 
[B]ecause the rule announced in [Metro West] was in a footnote with no 
reference to apparently conflicting prior case law, we ask the Utah Supreme 
Court to clarify the scope of remedies under rule 7(c)(3)(B)..., 
2004 UT App 354, %\5 n.2, essentially requesting that the rule be enforced as written or 
repealed. 
13
 W.B. Yeats, "Among School Children'" In the context of the present dispute, the 
critical interrelationship between policy and rule, to which Yeats's poem so admirably 
applies (and which Plaintiffs wish the Court to ignore), recalls the admonitory adage 
"anyone who draws a distinction between the spirit and the letter of the law is trying to 
disobey one or the other." 
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facts nevertheless somehow satisfy rule 7(c)(3)(B), then there is in reality no rule 
7(c)(3)(B) to satisfy. 
Howards' undisputed facts should have been deemed admitted. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT DISREGARDED THE EXPRESS MANDATE 
OF URCP RULE 56(d). 
Consonant with their tack on all the errors at issue—dismissing each as but a 
trivial infraction unworthy of notice—the Plaintiffs characterize as "sufficient^" the trial 
court's refusal to specify controverted material facts, as required by URCP Rule 56(d) 
(Br. Opp. 33-34), arguing that any analysis beyond what the trial court actually did would 
not have been "practicable" (id.). Here again, Plaintiffs urge a disquieting disregard of 
the rules. 
A glance at the record suffices to show that the trial court did not make even the 
slightest attempt to comply with Rule 56(d) but instead flatly denied that it had any such 
duty: "In a motion for summary judgment, it is not the Court's role to sort through and 
sift out all the facts that are 'thrown at it' to determine which facts are disputed and 
which are not" (R. 272). This, however, is precisely the court's role: "technically 
speaking, the obligation imposed on the district judge by Rule 56(d) to specify the 
uncontroverted material facts is compulsory." 10B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. 
Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure ("FPP"), Civ. 3d § 2737 
(1998).14 
14
 A court may, it seems, decline to enter a rule 56(d) if it "determines that... identifying 
the facts that no longer may be disputed would not materially expedite the adjudication." 
FPP § 2737. In the present matter, of course, the trial court made no such determination; 
on the contrary, the trial court's declaration that "sort[ing] through ... the facts 'thrown at 
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This was not, as Plaintiffs paint it, a question of "practicability," but of patent 
nonfeasance. Although presumably aware of the requirements of rule 56(d), the trial court 
simply made the nebulous statement that "there [were] numerous minor and major 
disputed issues of material fact" (id), but then pointedly refused "to list or itemize all the 
disputed facts" (id.), despite the mandate of the rule. 
C. THE PLAINTIFFS' INTERFERENCE CLAIM WAS BARRED BY 
RES JUDICATA, THE RELEVANT ISSUES IN BOTH THE 
EARLIER APPLICATION PROCEEDING AND THE TRIAL 
BELOW BEING IDENTICAL, 
Despite the State Engineer's denial of their earlier application to appropriate 
additional water from the Marriott Slough, Plaintiffs argue that res judicata did not bar 
their interference claim on the grounds that "[t]he disposition of that application for 
additional water does not even resemble, let alone implicate, the issues in this case." (Br. 
Opp. 35). Actually, however, the "additional water" Plaintiffs asserted before the State 
Engineer was water "foreign to the slough" (R. 148; Add. Tab E) to be "used with Water 
Right Number 35-8073" (R. 1451 f 1; quoted in Br.Opp. 35), is the same water Plaintiffs 
now claim and illegally use as apart of Water Right 35-8073 with which Lee Howard has 
somehow interfered. Plaintiffs' attempt to sidestep res judicata as to the water they were 
denied the use of by labeling it "additional" water for "supplemental irrigation" which 
"has no bearing on" their interference claim (Br. Opp. 35)—despite the fact that it is one 
of the foundation stones of their case—is akin to trying to hide King Kong in New York 
City with a hat and sunglasses. 
it'" is "not the Court's role" demonstrates the court's belief that no such effort was even 
necessary. 
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The issue in both the administrative proceeding and the present dispute are 
precisely the same in this regard: whether Plaintiffs are entitled to divert additional 
waters into the Slough and then to redivert them from the Slough for irrigation. What 
Plaintiffs call the water in question is utterly irrelevant. Res Judicata barred Plaintiffs' 
assertion that the water they add to the Slough after diverting it from the Warren Canal 
and retains a separate identity, and the trial court erred, both in permitting the allegation 
and in accepting it as grounds for denying Lee Howard's motion for summary 
judgment.15 
POINT 3 THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY DISPOSED OF 
THE HOWARD'S COUNTERCLAIMS. 
A. THE HOWARDS' TRESPASS COUNTERCLAIM. 
Intoning yet again their mantra that the trial court's mistake was "surely [a] 
harmless" error {id. at 37 n.7) to be waived off as trivial or, at worst, frowningly 
condoned, Plaintiffs disingenuously attempt to imbue the trial court's erroneous dismissal 
of Mr. Howard's trespass counterclaim with an intention that simply isn't there (Br.Opp. 
35-38). 
The Trial Court's August 23, 2004, Supplemental Decision (issued at the request 
of Howard's in his effort to allow the trial court to correct obvious errors without the 
necessity of Appeal) declares unambiguously, though incorrectly, that "the Defendants' 
trespass claim was formally withdrawn at trial" (R. 1275). As the Howards pointed out in 
15
 Plaintiffs end their argument on this point by asserting that "[b]ecause the matters were 
not related, Howard made no such claim at trial" (Br.Opp. 35). This, however, is untrue. 
The Howards directly addressed at trial the Plaintiffs' application before and its denial by 
the State Engineer on cross-examination. Doing so would have been pointless had the 
Howards not been directly addressing their res judicata arguments. 
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their opening Brief (pp. 45-46), and as Plaintiffs grudgingly acknowledge, this is simply 
not true: it was the Plaintiffs' trespass claim which was dismissed, not withdrawn. 
Irrespective of whether Lee Howard's trespass claim was litigated or not, the trial court's 
Decision was mistaken. Plaintiffs concede that the trial court's declaration was 
"obviously mistaken" (Br.Opp. 37), and that they "knew the claim was not withdrawn" 
(id.). 
Despite this, however, Plaintiffs demand that this Court grant effect to the trial 
court's error, dismissing a counterclaim which was never dismissed, based, not upon the 
plain text of the Decision, but upon (a) a fanciful analysis of what they believe the trial 
court meant to do and (b) the Findings and Conclusions they themselves drafted (to 
which the Howards properly objected (R. 1278-93)). This, however, is not only 
impossible (especially given the trial court's unambiguous statement), it also runs 
contrary to every principle of linguistic construction under Utah law.16 
Unfortunately for Plaintiffs, the plain language of the Decision mistakenly 
declares only that "the Defendants' trespass claim was formally withdrawn at trial" (R. 
1275); it makes no further representations, nor does it explain the statement in any way. 
16
 Mouty v. The Sandy City Recorder, 2005 UT 41, f 17, 122 P.3d 521 (statutes are 
interpreted to give effect to legislative intent as evidenced by the plain language, 
assuming each term was used advisedly, and only turning to "other modes of 
construction" if the language is ambiguous); Archer v. Bd. of State Lands and Forestry, 
907 P.2d 1142, 1145 (Utah 1995) ("administrative rules should generally be construed 
according to their plain language .... read[ing] each term literally unless such a reading is 
unreasonably inoperable" (citations omitted)); Saleh v. Farmers Ins, Exchange, 2006 UT 
20, K21, —P.3d—, 2006 WL 744261 ("If the language within the four corners of [a] 
contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of 
the contractual language" (citation omitted)). It seems only reasonable that judicial 
decisions should be subject to the same scrutiny afforded legislative and administrative 
enactments, as well as that applied to contracts. 
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Plaintiffs suggest that the trial court's actual intent is to be gleaned from its earlier, April 
2004, ruling: "The trial court believed it had resolved the counterclaims 'inferentially' in 
its original trial decision" (Br.Opp. 37). But the trial court didn't say this either. The 
actual statement was "[t]he issues contained in the Defendants' Counterclaim were 
addressed inferentially, but not directly" (R. 1275). There is a significant difference 
between Plaintiffs' "resolved ... 'inferentially,'" and the trial court's "addressed 
inferentially." The former language—Plaintiffs'—implies that one can read the April 
Decision and infer from the statements made therein that the trial court meant to dismiss 
Lee Howard's counterclaims. The latter language—the trial court's—actually makes no 
such assertion. Nor could the trial court make such a representation in good faith, since 
there is nothing in the earlier Decision from which one can infer any intent to dismiss the 
trespass counterclaim.17 
There is simply nothing to which the Plaintiffs can rationally point to demonstrate 
that the trial court did anything in the August Decision other than continue to ignore Lee 
Howard's trespass counterclaim as a result of its erroneous belief that the claim had been 
"formally withdrawn." 
B. T H E HOWARDS' NEGLIGENCE AND NUISANCE 
COUNTERCLAIMS. 
The Plaintiffs point to the trial court's FF f^f 33, 34, and 35, wherein the trial court 
It is ironic that Plaintiffs here attempt to undermine the certainty of plain and 
unambiguous judicial language, when their arguments concerning the Department of 
Water Rights website is a transparent attempt to gloss over the inherent uncertainties in a 
virtual document with no legal standing at all from which the State Engineer's office has 
expressly insulated itself by way of a disclaimer plainly warning against anyone 
assuming the certainty of anything on the website. 
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cites Plaintiffs' dredging and subsequent inundation of the Howards' land as a definitive 
and proper handling of the Howards' counterclaims for negligence and nuisance. 
{Br.Opp. 38.) Actually, however, FFs fflf 34 and 35 are legal conclusions, not findings at 
all, inasmuch as they render legal determinations as to negligence and nuisance (or rather 
their absence). This Court may address legal questions, of course, without regard to the 
findings of the trial court. See United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation 
Co., 2003 UT 49, \% 79 P.3d 945. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Lee Howard respectfully submits, in light of the foregoing, together with the 
arguments set forth in his Opening Brief, that the Plaintiffs failed utterly to prove their 
claims before the trial court. Plaintiffs have suffered no damage to their water right; to 
the contrary, Plaintiffs continue illegally to divert and appropriate many times the amount 
of water to which they are entitled. Plaintiffs cannot claim interference when they have 
suffered neither diminution in their supply nor pejoration of the quality of their water. 
The trial court therefore erred in granting Plaintiffs relief from harm they have never in 
reality suffered. 
Lee Howard therefore respectfully requests that this Court, first, reverse the trial 
court's Order denying the Howards' motions for summary judgment and order the trial 
court to enter judgment in favor of Lee Howard on Plaintiffs' interference claims; 
second, in the alternative, vacate the trial court's Final Judgment as to Plaintiffs' 
interference claims; third, order the trial court to enter judgment in favor of Lee Howard 
as to his trespass, nuisance, and negligence counterclaims, and enjoin Plaintiffs' acting 
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outside the bounds of their certificate of appropriation; and fourth, remand this matter to 
the trial court for a determination of punitive damages and attorney's fees. 
Dated this \ Q day of May, 2006. 
M. Ellsworth 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC 
Attorneys for Appellant Lee Howard 
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